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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In socialist economies the institutional setting of R&D and innovation activities (RDI) was 
entirely different from that in capitalist countries (Hanson and Pavitt, 1987). During the last 7 
years ex-socialist economies have significantly transformed their basic economic 
mechanisms in areas of ownership structure, market organization, financial system, foreign 
trade liberalization, and of enterprise organization (see EBRD 1994, 1995 and 1996). Within 
that context our concerns is whether RDI activities of PSE have converged into a market 
economy model or whether their RDI still differ in their basic features? Are RDI between 
‘East’ and ‘West’ converging or diverging in the post-socialist period? Do PSE possess a 
certain innovation features which make them still distinctively different from the RDI model 
of market economy or they are converging towards it? 
In the second part we analyse specific elements of convergence (divergence) between the  
RDI activities of ‘East’ and ‘West’. Comparative elements which form the analysis are those 
developed by Hanson and Pavitt (1987). In the third part we summarise elements of 
convergence / divergence in RDI and offer some explanations for still strong divergences in 
RDI. In the fourth part we develop two hypothetical scenarios regarding the future of RDI in 
PSE: a full convergence scenario with the market economy model and the scenario that takes 
into account evolutionary, especially path dependent features, of post-socialist 
transformation. Our conclusion is that RDI in PSE have in many elements converged towards 
the market economy model of RDI. Elements of divergence are that enterprises have not yet 
become the main agents of innovation; R&D is still externalised with significant problems in 
its management due to the role of state as owner who cannot simultaneously exercise a cash 
flow control function in R&D, and the new gaps which have emerged in RDI where applied 
and strategic R&D are absent from the spectrum of innovation activities. These differences 
result in weak innovation capabilities of post-socialist enterprises. RDI in PSE will eventually 
achieve the features of ‘designated future’ or ‘hypothesised end-state’ as specified by Hanson 
and Pavitt (1987). However, once RDI settle within the general features of the market 
economy model the most interest will focus on what are the innovation properties specific to 
eastern European capitalism(s)? These specific features of CEE capitalism are outlined in the 
fourth part. The conclusions summarise the main arguments. 
 
 
2. ELEMENTS OF CONVERGENCE AND DIVERGENCE BETWEEN ‘EAST’ AND 
‘WEST’ 
 
  Questions that we want to deal with assume that there are certain fundamentals of the 
market economy in the innovation sphere which make it distinctively different from a 
socialist economy. Indeed, analysis of Hanson and Pavitt (1987), which we take here as a 
starting point, assumes that these fundamentals do exist.  
  Pavitt (1991) and Hanson and Pavitt (1987) find differences in RDI between ‘East’ and 
‘West’ in the following elements which are relatively weaker or not at all present in the 
socialist economy: 
 
1. The location and funding of R&D, and related technical activities. Given the 
differentiated, specific and often tacit nature of technology, innovative activities within Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
Innovation between ‘East’ And ‘West’? In Brzezinski, H and Fritsch, M (eds):  Innovation 
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enterprises are crucial for generating useful knowledge and products. In socialism these were 
mainly performed in extra-mural institutions. 
 
2. Priorities in technological activities (military; development and testing; product vs. 
process innovations). Given the uncertainties embodied in innovation activities a diversity of 
innovative efforts efforts by different enterprises encompassing the entire spectrum of 
technological activities is more likely to lead to successful innovation. In socialism 
technological activities were heavily skewed towards military applications, with priority 
given to research over development and testing, and forcing product over process innovation.  
 
3. Incentives for innovation and diffusion (incentives for innovation; competition policy). 
The prospect of temporary monopoly profits, competition and hard budget constraints 
(limited budget) are preconditions for innovative behaviour. Soft budget constraint, lack of 
competition and monopoly deterred innovative behaviour in socialism. 
 
4. Decentralisation, diversity and pluralism (firms and sectoral patterns of innovations). 
Given the differentiated and often tacit nature of knowledge of technologies and markets, 
decentralised decision making is superior as a mechanism when compared to centralised 
decision making; 
 
5. Linkages into the international economy (trade openness; technology transfer channels). 
Open markets are likely to sharpen incentives and increase innovative and imitative 
opportunities. The closed economy weakened incentives to innovate. Lack of exposure to 
learn from foreign markets and partners slowed down innovation dynamics. 
 
 
6. The role of the state. Given the above characteristics (1- 5) the role of the state in the 
market economy is one of exercising indirect influence in RDI and much less direct control 
over innovation processes.  
 
  To take this further, we use these characteristics, in somewhat modified form, as a base 
from which to assess how much post-socialist RDI activities have departed from the 
characteristics of the socialist RDI as well as how much they have converged towards the 
market economy model. These elements are summarised in the table below and our analysis 
follow its structure. For a discussion on these elements in the market economy see Hanson 
and Pavitt (1987). The reader should bear in mind that these are highly stylised features that 
do not do justice to the differences that existed among the CMEA countries or to country 
specific differences in the post-socialist period. However, numerous common post-socialist 
features in transformation of RDI make our inquiry relevant across a large number of the 
PSE. 
 
ELEMENTS OF CONVERGENCE - DIVERGENCE IN  
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION 
 BETWEEN ‘EAST’ AND ‘WEST’ 
 
  SOCIALISM  POST-SOCIALISM 
1. The location and funding of R&D and related technical activities Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
Innovation between ‘East’ And ‘West’? In Brzezinski, H and Fritsch, M (eds):  Innovation 
and Technical Change in Eastern Europe. Pathways to Industrial Recovery, Edward Elgar, 
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1.a. Financing and 
location 
Investments in R&D are 
above the average of 
comparable economies. 
R&D for industry and not 
in industry. Dominantly 
state budget funding. 
Sharp decline in RDI 
funding to the level of 
comparable medium 
income economies. R&D 
system is still dominantly 
extra-mural. 
1.b. Large users - 
specialised suppliers link 
Lack of specialised 
suppliers, especially small 
firms. 
Emergence of specialised 
suppliers, especially small 
firms 
1.c. Basic research - 
teaching link 
Separation of basic 
research and teaching. 
Low R&D activities by 
universities. 
Gradual merging of basic 
research and teaching. 
Relative increase of R&D 
by universities. 
2. Priorities in technological activities 
2.a. Weapons R&D  Dominantly military 
oriented R&D 
Strong absolute decrease 
in military R&D 
2.b. Development/testing 
vs. research 
Dominantly intermediate 
(research) outputs 
Polarization of R&D 
spectrum. Relative 
decline of applied R&D. 
2.c. Process vs. product 
innovation 
Dominantly product 
development 
Process development and 
process efficiency grow in 
importance  
3. Incentives for innovation and diffusion 
3.a. Non-market vs. 
market incentives 
Dominantly political 
incentives 
Increasing complexity of 
innovation incentives 
3.b. Threats to laggards  No exit and no threats to 
laggards 
Exit becomes possible. 
Weak competition policy 
4. Decentralization, diversity and pluralism 
4.a. Decentralization  Business decisions 
diffused across hierarchy 
Business decisions 
distributed between 
managers and outside 
owners 
4.b. Diversity among 
sectors in the nature of 
innovation 
No differences in sectoral 
innovation pattern  
Emerging sectoral 
diversities in innovation 
patterns.  
4.c. Pluralism in 
technological activities 
Limited pluralism among 
branches 
Pluralism of technological 
activities. Variety of 
search efforts. 
5. Linkages in the international economy 
5.a. Economic incentives 
from world markets 
Closed system and 
innovation autarchy 
Liberal foreign trade 
systems  
5.b. Public funded R&D 
cooperation 
Very restricted R&D 
cooperation 
Foreign funded research 
and science cooperation 
5.c. Technology transfer  Dominantly import of 
equipment and licences 
Diversified technology 
transfer channels 
6. The role of the state Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
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6.b. Cash - flow control  Total control of cash-
flows  
State funding still 
dominant 
6.a. Ownership role  Total control of 
innovation process 
State control mixed with 
private control. State 
decides type and pace of 
privatization in R&D  
 
2.1. The location and funding of R&D 
 
2.1.a. Financing and location of R&D 
  RDI activities in the socialist systems had two important features that made them 
distinctively different from RDI in market economies.  
  First, due to their closed character and weak incentives the share of gross expenditures for 
R&D in gross domestic product (GERD/GDP) in socialist economies were far above the 
relative levels of comparable medium-income economies (Radosevic, 1994a), (Auriol and 
Radosevic, 1996). The closed economy led to R&D whose sectoral and quality structure was 
removed from the world economy. The R&D system was controlled by agents whose 
interests were in forced expansion, which led to over-expanded R&D, not expansion by 
enterprises and consumers. R&D funding predominantly came from the State budget. Even 
when contracts were made between enterprises and R&D institutes funding was still provided 
through State channels (Cocks, 1980). 
  Second, in socialist economies RDI were dominantly oriented towards industry, but was 
separated from enterprises, and was located in industrial R&D institutes. Elsewhere we 
described such situation as R&D for industry but not in industry (Radosevic, 1994b). As a 
consequence, when compared to the market-economy, socialist economies had higher shares 
of extra-mural R&D. For example, Meske (1994) shows that the share of non-university 
R&D in total R&D in DDR was two times higher than in FRG. In the market economy RDI 
is performed mainly by industrial enterprises while under socialism it was mainly in extra-
mural R&D organizations. This led both to numerous weaknesses in links between R&D and 
industry and to R&D which was not always relevant to industry. 
  With the break up of the socialist system we would expect RDI in post-socialism to be 
transformed into intra-mural R&D. However, this transformation turns out to be more 
complex than originally envisaged for two reasons. 
  First, with post-socialism came a sharp decrease in R&D funding (see EU, 1994; OECD, 
1996). This was not only the result of deteriorating budgetary conditions but also of natural 
shrinkage of previously over-expanded and non-competitive R&D systems where much so-
called R&D was the ‘reinventing the wheel’ type. Elsewhere we have tried to estimate 
whether this fall to ‘natural’ levels of GERD/GDP in PSE will lead to the loss of their 
distinctive advantage (see Radosevic, 1995). 
  Second, it was expected that marketization would lead to the integration of R&D into 
industrial enterprises. However, this does not appear to have happened, or at least not on any 
significant scale but we still do not have systematic inter-country evidence on this point. 
Nevertheless, case studies on industrial institutes in Hungary (Mosoni-Fried, 1995), Russia 
(Lauer-Couderc, 1995), and on eastern Germany (Schneider, 1995) confirm this. 
Explanations for such a trend come from both the demand as well as on supply side. 
Inadequate structure of extra-mural R&D under new market conditions in addition to the 
inability of industrial enterprises to embody technological innovation, led to a situation where Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
Innovation between ‘East’ And ‘West’? In Brzezinski, H and Fritsch, M (eds):  Innovation 
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R&D continues to be extra-mural. For example, in Russia for the period 1991-1994 only 
about one-fifth of industrial enterprise innovation was provided with its own R&D (Glaziev 
et al.., 1996, p.17). In most cases the only option for R&D institutes is ‘self-enterprization’ or 
transformation of R&D institutes into industrial or service companies. 
 
2.1.b. Large scale users - specialised suppliers interaction 
 
In the ‘West’ applied R&D is organizationally integrated with production, whilst a significant 
proportion of production technology comes from small specialised firms supplying capital 
goods (Hanson and Pavitt, 1987). In socialist economies applied R&D was organizationally 
separated from production, with the development of process technologies and associated 
capital goods being concentrated almost exclusively in large organizations. Such a 
monostructure created huge inefficiencies and lacked technological dynamics.  
  The freedom to be able to set up new firms has led to the emergence of specialised 
suppliers and small enterprises (SMEs). As a result of still patchy growth in the region and 
relatively bigger gaps in services it is mainly SMEs in services which are booming. The 
export growth of specialised suppliers’ sectors in Hungary and the Czech R. indicates the rise 
in SMEs specialised suppliers (Guerrieri, 1995; Butlor, 1995). In software, SMEs are taking 
over the functions of specialised suppliers which before were all performed by large 
electronics conglomerates (Katkalo, 1993). Nevertheless, the number of SMEs, especially in 
the manufacturing sector, is still significantly below the EU average (see EBRD, 1995, p.140) 
which means that this structural gap will continue for some time. 
  The innovation capability of SMEs in PSE still seems to be very low. As stated by 
Gokhberg and Kuznetsova (1996, p.15) in Russia ‘three times less SMEs in comparison with 
big ones were engaged in R&D, four times less frequently they purchased results of R&D by 
contract and two times less frequently acquired know-how. According to the data for 1994, 
only 3 small enterprises managed to buy licences on use of inventions’ (p.15). In the case of 
Poland innovativeness in SMEs is also lower but not to such an extent as in Russia. In Poland 
the most innovative are the large and medium-sized enterprises of which 80% introduced 
some kind of innovation to the market in 1992 while the corresponding share for SMEs was 
only 46% (Korona, 1994). 
  Under socialism, the dominant learning path was development from research to production 
and then to distribution and users. In post-socialism users are becoming an important source 
of learning, similar to market economies. This is confirmed by data from a Hungarian 
innovation survey where clients/customers and suppliers of materials, components and 
equipment stand as the most important source of information for innovation (see Inzelt, 
1995). 
 
2.1.c. Basic research - university teaching 
 
  Under the socialist system research was separated from teaching and universities were 
primarily teaching institutions.1 The share of GERD performed by universities varied in the 
PSE from 1% in Czech Republic to 14% in Hungary, and especially in basic sciences 
                                                 
1This should be taken as a very rough description since in many cases Academy researchers were involved in 
teaching. In the case of the defence sector the involvement of military universities in research was much more 
significant. Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
Innovation between ‘East’ And ‘West’? In Brzezinski, H and Fritsch, M (eds):  Innovation 
and Technical Change in Eastern Europe. Pathways to Industrial Recovery, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham 
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Academies of Sciences (AoS) were performing the most research. This situation has 
downgraded research at universities and deprived teaching of close link with research.  
  In post-socialism universities in some CEECs have improved their relative share of R&D, 
sometimes even doubling it. In Hungary universities now perform 26.4% of GERD (1994), 
and in Poland 22.6% (1993) which is similar to shares in OECD countries. However, 
proportion is still marginal in Czech R (4.5%), Slovakia (4.9%) and Russia (5.9%) (1994) 
(OECD, 1996). In the long-term, universities are very likely to improve further their position 
in research. Their funding stability which comes from teaching, when coupled with the 
increasing opportunities to apply under equal terms for research funding, will enhance their 
R&D position. 
  The system of state planning of research has been abolished in all CEE countries which 
have all re-established freedom of research. Teachers have the right to choose their own 
research subject. The new system of research funding and management is one in which 
competitive grants are awarded to individual research projects on the basis of peer review. 
Although peer review constitutes a break with the centralised funding and management 
practices of the past it is not a system without problems especially when discrepancies 
between available funds and number of researchers are huge. (For an extensive discussion on 
this see Frankel and Cave, 1997). 
 
2.2. Priorities in technological activities  
 
2.2.a. Weapons R&D 
 
  The ‘Cold War’ pushed R&D systems in the ‘East’ strongly towards military activities. At 
the end of the 1980s defence R&D spending in the former Soviet Union amounted to some 
20% of total defence budget which made some 70% of total expenditure in R&D (OECD, 
1994, p.165)(Gokhberg, 1996). Although most of science-intensive civil products 
manufactured were produced at the defence enterprises there was no full-fledged adaptation 
of military technologies to civil purposes. In addition, as pointed out in OECD (1994) 
technology flow from military to civil industries was insufficient to create a normal civil 
technological base outside the military sector (p.167).  
  In the post-socialist period there is a absolute decrease of military R&D. Military R&D 
spending is levelling off to more normal levels reaching, in the case of Russia, around 10% of 
total military expenditures, similar to the US. However, quantitative similarities do not reveal 
the complexity of the situation. Conversion programmes are faced with significant problems 
among which the lack of civil demand for science-intensive production is the most serious. 
Despite the limited effects of conversion programs analysts are cautiously optimistic as the 
process of restructuring, downsizing of defence enterprises and formation of alliances to 
overcome marketing and finance barriers takes place (For a detailed analysis see Gonchar et 
al.., 1995; and Bzhilianskaja, 1996). 
 
2.2.b. Development and testing activities vs. research:  
 
An over-expanded R&D system and lack of innovation under socialism resulted in mainly 
‘intermediate’ R&D products, like documentation and engineering designs. There were 
comparatively fewer ‘downstream’ technological activities like testing, tooling up and 
incremental process innovations. Most ‘R&D results ready for implementation’ were waiting Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
Innovation between ‘East’ And ‘West’? In Brzezinski, H and Fritsch, M (eds):  Innovation 
and Technical Change in Eastern Europe. Pathways to Industrial Recovery, Edward Elgar, 
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to be ‘transferred’ to production. With the changes in the supply and demand for technology 
brought by post-socialism this structure of the R&D and innovation spectrum has also 
changed. Technological activities are now skewed towards downstream non-R&D activities 
like testing and standards as these are now critical for exports. The R&D horizon of 
enterprises has shortened significantly while the demand for technology has shifted towards 
incremental process innovation, and immediate problem-solving activities. Enterprises have 
moved towards development activities and abandoned applied R&D. 
  For example, in the case of Russia, the share of development activities increased from 
80.1% (1990) to 90.8% (1994) while the share of applied R&D and basic research activities 
of enterprises decreased from 18.4% and 1.5% to 9.1% and to 0.1% respectively (Glaziev et 
al.,, 1996, p.17). Although we do not have comparable data before 1989 and after 1989 it 
seems that the structure of innovation costs of enterprises is becoming in line with the market 
economy, at least in some countries. An experimental Hungarian innovation survey shows 
that R&D still comprises the biggest component of innovation cost (48.2%) while relative 
costs for patents and licences (23.7%), training, tooling and up and trial production (14.6%) 
and costs for market analysis (3.8%) are relatively high (Inzelt, 1995). The share of product 
design is relatively low (6.8%). 
  In parallel to shifts at firm level, the State reduced its funding on those RDI activities that 
can be justified by the market failure argument (cf. basic science). As a result the whole R&D 
community has shifted towards basic science since it is there that the State support is focused, 
while the demand for technology has moved towards non-R&D and downstream activities. 
This has weakened applied and strategic research leading to polarization of the R&D 
spectrum. By this we mean that relatively applied research is shrinking while basic research 
and the development/testing part of the R&D spectrum is being relatively reinforced 
(Radosevic, 1994b). For example, in the case of Russia, the share of applied R&D in the 
value of R&D institutions projects has been continuously falling from 32.7% (1989) to 22% 
(1995) (Gokhberg, 1996, table 13, p.43). 
 
2.2.c. Process and product improvements 
 
  Under socialism the technological emphasis was much more on product development. This 
was consistent with a system that was ‘forcing growth’ and which neglected user needs and 
cost concerns.  
  This product innovation bias is changing in the post-socialism as user needs and cost 
considerations have become pivotal for market survival. Export requirements are increasing 
the emphasis on quality considerations (for example, ISO 9902 standards). Cost 
considerations play an even more important role as these economies are most often 
competing in low cost market segments.  
  Innovation surveys only partially confirm expected shift towards process innovations. Only 
the Hungarian innovation survey mentioned above shows that improvement in product 
quality stands as the most important objective of innovations introduced between 1990-1993 
in 71% of the analysed sample of enterprises (Inzelt, 1995). A Russian innovation survey 
indicates that among innovative enterprises 63% have also introduced new or improved 
technological processes alongside 80.5% that introduced new or improved products 
(Gokhberg and Kuznetsova, 1996, table 2). A Polish innovation survey for 1992 indicates 
that the dominant type of innovation is product innovation whereby the share of significant 
and incremental product innovations in the total number of innovations introduced amounted Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
Innovation between ‘East’ And ‘West’? In Brzezinski, H and Fritsch, M (eds):  Innovation 
and Technical Change in Eastern Europe. Pathways to Industrial Recovery, Edward Elgar, 
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to 54.6% (Korona, 1994). However, the share of process innovations (18.5%), mechanization 
and automatization of the technological processes (12.3%) and organizational innovations 
related to technological innovation (14.2%), indicates also strong reorientation towards 
process innovations. In total, the number of innovations introduced in Poland in 1992 which 
resulted in energy and material savings, amounted to 20.3% indicating new sensitivity to 
environment and cost issues (ibid.). 
  In summary, enterprises in the post-socialist context are reorienting their innovation 
activities according to the changing business environment. They are focusing their innovative 
activities not only towards product innovations but also towards process innovations. In this 
respect we can talk about convergence in innovative efforts. However, a more detailed 
comparison between ‘eastern’ and ‘western’ innovation surveys would be needed in order to 
reach more firm conclusions regarding the direction of innovative efforts and their links with 
external factors. 
 Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
Innovation between ‘East’ And ‘West’? In Brzezinski, H and Fritsch, M (eds):  Innovation 
and Technical Change in Eastern Europe. Pathways to Industrial Recovery, Edward Elgar, 
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2.3. Incentives for innovation and diffusion 
 
2.3.a. Non-market incentives vs. the complexity of incentive structures 
 
Innovation in market economies is stimulated through a large variety of mechanisms for 
appropriating the benefits of these investments. Patents, secrecy, lead times, learning curve 
advantages, etc. are all innovation incentive mechanisms derived from the basic tenets of the 
market economy (Dosi, 1988). 
  Under socialism incentives were for a long period entirely non-economic (plan or political 
mobilization). However, the history of personal economic incentives within a basically 
centrally planned system is long in socialism. Within the framework of the system of 
production -oriented planning, considerable use was made of personal incentives for both 
management and workers in order to encourage plan fulfilment (Dyker, 1985). At the shop 
floor level different systems of ‘material incentives’, or different bonuses, were introduced in 
order to enhance individual productivity. Parallel with this, reforms of the R&D system were 
directed towards replacing central planing with economic incentives which would guide 
R&D organizations to work autonomously towards the goal of S&T plans (Zaleski et al., 
1969, part V.G). Only latterly, especially in Hungary and Poland, were incentives introduced 
on an economy-wide basis by making enterprises economically independent, and more 
market based incentives were built-in through different forms of ‘market socialism’ (Kornai, 
1992; Swaan and Lisowska, 1992). However, the mechanisms for appropriating innovation 
rents were non-existent as technology was considered to be a free good. Under the socialist 
system, innovation was essentially a non-competitive process, much more dependent on 
political will and individual decisions than on economic incentives. 
  Now, with post-socialism and the introduction of factor markets, the incentives and 
freedom to develop mechanisms for appropriating innovation benefits have been created. In 
sectors where patents are important the change took place before 1989 in some PSE (OECD, 
1995). The protection systems in former socialist countries were based on Soviet type 
regulations, the so-called ‘inventor’s system’ or ‘author’s certificates’.2 
  With their reform laws of 1969 and 1972 respectively, Hungary and Poland abolished the 
Soviet type protection regulation for inventions. Bulgaria, Romania and Czechoslovakia, 
however, retained the Soviet type system of IPR to the end of the socialist period. The quite 
obsolete patent systems of these countries with the Soviet system enabled them to modernise 
patent protection much quicker than has been the case in Hungary and Poland (OECD, 1995). 
Russia changed from author certificates to patents in 1991 (Gorodnikova, 1996).  
  In sectors where the nature of innovation protection and incentives is different, various 
forms of appropriating innovation rents are developing. Lead times, learning curve 
advantages, know-how, secrecy, etc. are diverse forms of appropriation of innovation rents 
that enterprises develop in order to build competitive advantages. Operation of these 
                                                 
2This system had little to do with the intellectual property in the market economy sense of the word, even if in 
some respects, for example, the 'technical' aspects of patent procedure or the rule on remuneration of employed 
inventors it was similar. An author certificate certifies recognition of an application as an invention, its priority 
and authorship, the exclusive rights of the state to use and take charge of the invention, as well as securing the 
rights and privileges of the author as specified by legislation. As distinct from the author certificate, a patent 
certifies the exclusive rights of the author (the patent owner) to the invention (OECD, 1995), Gorodnikova 
(1996).  Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
Innovation between ‘East’ And ‘West’? In Brzezinski, H and Fritsch, M (eds):  Innovation 
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incentive mechanisms is dependent on the degree of competition and the existence of 
temporary monopoly profits based on innovation rents.  
  Beside these ‘normal’ appropriation mechanisms the prosperity of enterprises in PSE 
depends equally on their ability to cope with the uncertain environment. The more uncertain 
the environment, the more it matters whether enterprises are part of a wider formal (domestic 
holding or foreign MNC) or informal network (‘old boys network’, inherited customer - 
supplier relationships, link with the government). The character of these networks determines 
the character of incentives - rent-seeking or productive incentives - to which an enterprise is 
exposed (For analysis along these lines see Kuznetsov, 1997, Grabher and Stark 1997). 
 
2.3.b. The credibility of threats to laggards: competition policy 
 
  Innovation incentives are strongly influenced by and dependent on the prevailing incentives 
in product markets. Competition was completely absent throughout most of the socialist 
period. With post-socialism it is to be expected that the old monopolistic structures will be 
either undermined, or broken. This is the case in many countries although, new monopolies, 
many of which are connected with the presence of foreign investors, are emerging. These are 
present in sectors like cars or telecoms where governments trade market access for 
modernisation of sector (see EBRD, 1994).  
  In post-socialism, competition policy is important as PSE have inherited a very high degree 
of industrial concentration and vertical integration. This partly explains the problems over 
implementing anti-monopoly policies. For the time being the best form of competition policy 
in these countries seems to be foreign trade liberalization and in this respect they are well 
placed. Foreign trade and foreign exchange systems in 6 out of the 25 PSE, or in all central 
European economies, are as liberalised as in advanced industrial economies (see EBRD, 
1995). Though the enforcement of bankruptcy procedures is weak there is a threat to laggards 
from foreign competition. This explains the increasing polarization in competitiveness among 
domestic enterprises which indirectly may foster innovation.  
 
2. 4. Decentralization, diversity and pluralism 
 
2.4.a. Decentralisation  
Innovation and technology are essentially firm and network-specific phenomena. Decision 
making on these matters under socialism was removed from enterprise. Throughout the 
socialist period there were attempts to decentralise decision-making. In reforming socialist 
economies, like Hungary and Poland, this process forged ahead. In USSR in the late 1970s 
there was a certain trend towards decentralization of R&D management through the 
establishment of branch based funds for S&T development (Glaziev et al.., 1996, p.7). Only 
in 1987 in the USSR did the Law on State-Owned Enterprises give enterprises the freedom to 
operate on an independent basis but without the incentives and pressure on management to 
operate economically.  
  Through privatization enterprises in PSE are re-emerging as the main agents in innovation 
decisions. This is particularly true for new private firms while less so for privatised firms. 
The question to what extent privatised enterprises are really independent in this respect is not 
so simple. So far, privatization has not produced the type of governance structures that are 
similar to the model of market economy. A substantial proportion of firms still remain in state Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
Innovation between ‘East’ And ‘West’? In Brzezinski, H and Fritsch, M (eds):  Innovation 
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Cheltenham 
 
12 
hands or are controlled by insiders (see EBRD, 1995, chapter 8). Markets for corporate 
control do not yet exist even in cases where the outside control is significant, like in Czech 
Republic. Although privatised firms are interlinked through ownership into a complex web 
with other organizations (banks, investment privatization funds, other enterprises) they 
basically make decisions on products, processes, suppliers, customers and prices. None of the 
PSE has retained comprehensive price liberalization, though, problems of price liberalization 
are mainly confined to utilities.  
 
2.4.b. Diversity among sectors in the nature of innovation 
 
In the market economy one can find diversity among sectors in terms of sources of 
innovation, mechanisms of appropriation and types of innovating firms (Pavitt, 1984; 
Klevorick et al., 1995; Breschi and Malerba, 1997), i.e.: 
 in sources (R&D, product engineering; design; suppliers; customers) 
 in size and degree of diversification of typical innovating firms 
 in the means of appropriation of innovation benefits (Hanson and Pavitt, 1987) 
  The uniform organization of socialist RDI activities has suppressed natural differences 
among sectors in terms of innovation patterns. Socialism drastically reduced the 
organizational diversity of firms which in turn suppressed potential diversity of innovation 
patterns. A linear model of innovation process was assumed to be natural in all industrial 
sectors and the feedback coming from users was considered unimportant in all sectors. 
Whether it was clothing, coal or the electronics industry the organization model of RDI was 
fairly similar. Users were not a source of knowledge let alone innovation (Popper, 1989). As 
analysed in Zaleski et al.. (1969) there were variations between branches but the real 
difference was in the defence sector. Users in this sector were competent and powerful and 
shaped the innovation process. 
  With the coming of post-socialism the diversity of firm sizes as well as different 
organizational forms within the same sectors or strategic groups is becoming pronounced. 
This process is a basic precondition for different innovation patterns (Stark, 1996). 
Emergence of the diversity among sectors in the nature of innovation; in its sources; in the 
size and the degree of diversification of firms and in the means by which they appropriate 
innovation results opens possibilities for much more diversified innovation dynamic. There 
are four stylised processes of enterprise creation in post-socialism: new enterprise creation 
(‘greenfield’), unbundling of former socialist industrial units; creation of new, durable inter-
enterprise networks (eg. industrial-financial groups, post-socialist holding companies), and, 
transformation of socialist administrations into enterprises (Hirschhausen, 1996). 
Organizational diversity emerging in post-socialism will induce different innovation patterns. 
However, we still do not have a sufficiently clear picture of the innovative behaviour of 
different enterprise forms in CEE to generalise on the effects of this diversity on innovation 
behaviour.  
 
2.4.c. Pluralism in technological activities  
 
  Decentralization brings diversity of innovative patterns across different sectors as well as 
diversity of technological activities across different enterprises in the same sectors. 
Wastefulness of diversity in the market economy is actually its main source of dynamic 
efficiency. Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
Innovation between ‘East’ And ‘West’? In Brzezinski, H and Fritsch, M (eds):  Innovation 
and Technical Change in Eastern Europe. Pathways to Industrial Recovery, Edward Elgar, 
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  By definition, a central planning system should avoid ‘wasteful duplication’ (Hanson and 
Pavitt, 1987). This is one of its basic rationales which holds ground only if the economy is 
seen in static terms. If seen as an evolutionary and dynamic process with pervasive 
information uncertainties then duplication becomes justifiable (Grabher and Stark, 1997). In 
this respect post-socialism abounds by the numerous parallel search efforts which are 
essential for innovation. Freedom to experiment through different enterprise strategies, and 
freedom to experiment with new organizational forms will enable the emergence of new 
innovation trajectories (Nelson, 1995). Parallelism of technology activities is a necessary 
ingredient of economy’s adaptive efficiency.  
  We should bear in mind that pluralism in technological activities in the market economy 
rests on numerous market interactions or linkages based on the competitive advantage of 
alternative suppliers, or on broader supply and demand considerations. In this respect 
pluralism of technology activities in post-socialism will not develop unless efficient 
competitive linkages, both between enterprises and the finance and infrastructural sectors, 
and between different enterprises are not developed or supported (see EBRD, 1996, chapter 
7). Pluralism of technology activities in post-socialism will develop only if non-market 
elements, like institutional systems (legal and information infrastructure), improve. 
  The situation in this respect differs significantly between central European and ex-Soviet 
Union republics3 as well as between central and eastern European economies. Therefore, it is 
impossible to generalise about the degree of institutional development towards a market 
economy let alone on its link to technology pluralism. What is obvious in practice is that 
there is enormous diversity of search efforts, especially through local entrepreneurship, but 
this does not necessarily produce diversity in terms of technologies (see Gabor, 1996., on this 
point in case of Hungary). 
 
2.5. Linkages with the international economy (trade openness; technology transfer 
channels) 
 
2.5.a. Economic incentives and signals coming from the world market 
 
The closed character of socialist economies created RDI activities which were far removed in 
structure from the world economy. As pointed out earlier, trade and investment openness of 
the central European PSE stand quite well when compared with advanced market economies 
(EBRD, 1995; World Bank, 1996). The current trade and investment openness of PSE are 
exemplified in the radically changing competitiveness of R&D capabilities of specific 
sectors. The best example is the electronics sector that in its original form was wiped out in a 
matter of months. Dominantly imitative technology effort in the socialist period has revealed 
its poor competitiveness. As a result of enterprise closure the value of R&D also contracted 
but the human capital from this sector is now in excess supply. In countries where outflows 
of personnel from R&D could not be absorbed by the economy R&D operates as a sort of 
social safety net (Radosevic, 1994b). However, this is not the case in all sectors. For instance 
in  sectors like electronics and software, where new demand is looming large in all PSEs, the 
sector is being rebuilt through SMEs or joint-ventures. The economic openness has pushed 
into motion selection mechanisms of ‘creative destruction’. Instead of imitative R&D which 
                                                 
3For a discussion on the differences between central European and ex-Soviet Union republics with an emphasis 
on the Ukraine see Hirschhausen, 1996. Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
Innovation between ‘East’ And ‘West’? In Brzezinski, H and Fritsch, M (eds):  Innovation 
and Technical Change in Eastern Europe. Pathways to Industrial Recovery, Edward Elgar, 
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was developed on a large scale competitive R&D and technology may emerge in some areas 
(Dyker, 1996).  
 
2.5.b. R&D cooperation  
 
The openness of science systems is one of the key factors of innovation. In the last 10-15 
years this has been further reinforced through increasing international (Luukonen et al., 1992) 
and inter-institutional collaboration in science (Katz and Hicks, 1995). 
  In socialist times any science communication was very restricted. For example,  only 15% 
of researchers in the Romanian Academy of Sciences have authored papers in international 
journals (Eisemon et al., 1996). Closed science systems led to science output with very little 
knowledge about new research methods. In general, with the exception of fields like physics, 
chemistry and biomedicine the cognitive principles governing the work of researchers during 
socialist times differed from those of their foreign colleagues (see Kereva et al., 1993). 
  With post-socialism trade openness and free communications have induced new forms of 
technology and R&D cooperation. The Hungarian innovation survey shows that R&D 
cooperation with foreign suppliers, clients and customers ranks among the highest as a source 
of innovation (Inzelt, 1995). From a system of very controlled and limited R&D cooperation, 
which was re-inforced by CO-COM regulations, PSE are developing different forms of 
public R&D cooperation primarily driven through foreign funding (INTAS, Copernicus, 
Soros, etc.). One effect of this has been that the presence of researchers in foreign 
publications has increased significantly in the post-socialist period (see Haveman, 1996) 
indicating increasing openness of science systems and wider spread of international R&D 
networks in post-socialist countries. 
 
2.5.c. Technology transfer mechanisms 
 
As much as R&D systems of socialist economies were over-expanded and closed so were 
technology transfer mechanisms below the level of comparable economies. The dominant 
technology transfer mechanisms were import of equipment, licences and turnkey transfer 
(Hill et al., 1993). Licences were usually not renewed, turnkey transfer was rare and only 
occurred in the case of large projects.  
  The opening of these economies led to diversification of technology transfer channels to 
foreign direct investments (FDI), cooperative agreements (strategic alliances) and 
subcontracting (Radosevic, 1997). In none of these mechanisms have PSE yet reached the 
levels of many comparable economies. Their trade, production and technology integration 
opportunities are far from being exploited.  
  The mere existence of these mechanisms does not imply that the PSE will become 
technologically integrated into the world economy (Radosevic, 1996b). However, the post-
socialist situation creates opportunities for catching-up through FDI, subcontracting and other 
forms of integration at the level of production networks that some of these countries will 
exploit better than others.  
 
2.6. The role of the state  
 Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
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In a market economy the state exercises its control on RDI through S&T policy which 
includes basic research and education, standards, regulations and support of technical change 
in specific sectors.  
  The role of the State in RDI under socialism was all encompassing. The State was not only 
involved in R&D activities but also in technology transfer from industrial institutes into 
enterprises. As enterprises were not business, but only production units, there was an 
extensive need for external mediation across different levels of socialist hierarchies.  
  To understand the role of the State in RDI in post-socialism it is important to distinguish 
between its role as the owner and as the cash flow controller in the R&D system.4 Control 
rights are the rights to make decisions on how to use the assets. Cash flow rights are the 
rights to earn benefits and pay costs that result from a particular use of the assets. The 
ownership structure is inefficient when control rights are dissociated from cash flow rights. In 
market economy RDI the problem of dissociation of cash-flow from control rights does not 
exist as the institutional structure of the R&D makes these functions clear. Institutional 
sectors in market economy are: enterprise R&D, university R&D, government R&D and 
private non-profit research organizations. However, in post-socialism the distinction between 
these two categories becomes blurred as the State is unable to exercise its cash flow control 
function but has retained its ownership function (control rights). This has created several 
transitional phenomena in the R&D system, like hybridization of R&D institutes, ‘quasi spin-
offs’ and spontaneous privatization, which are present in all PSE, and which dilute the 
effectiveness of R&D (see Radosevic, 1994b, and 1996). 
 
2.6.a. Ownership role 
 
PSE have followed different paths in their privatization of R&D institutes. The responses 
have ranged from very quick privatization of R&D institutes, which were treated as any other 
enterprise (cf. Czech R), to prolonged subsidy of R&D institutes and reluctance to enable 
their privatization (cf. Romania). In these latter cases, despite still formal control rights of the 
State, the real control is shared between the State and management through different forms of 
quasi-spin offs and spontaneous privatization (Radosevic, 1996). In many respects this is 
basically a continuation of the process that started with the introduction of cooperatives 
attached to R&D institutes, and which enabled workers to earn additional income through 
contract activities.5 However, in post-socialism conflicts in control are often so big that 
survival strategies at the institute level are unrelated to the nominal status of the organization. 
 
2.6.b. Cash flow control 
 
Government R&D funding policies in the PSE range from sudden cuts in funding to gradual 
decreases. Funding criteria (project vs. institutional funding), evaluation procedures (peer 
review vs. negotiations) and budgetary conditions differ increasingly across different PSE 
(Frankel and Cave, 1997; Radosevic, 1996). In economies where public funding suffices 
more for subsistence than for normal R&D work, the cash flow control function is in the 
hands of management and employees. This situation has created a rich array of survival 
                                                 
4For this distinction in the case of Russian privatisation see Boycko et al. (1995). 
5In Russia the number of R&D co-operatives has increased from 2100 in 1989 to 10400 in 1990 (Katkalo, 
1993). In Hungary, also, different forms of intra-entrepreneurship were developed where such groups were 
basically subcontracting units of other organisations (see Balazs, 1995). Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
Innovation between ‘East’ And ‘West’? In Brzezinski, H and Fritsch, M (eds):  Innovation 
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strategies at the institute level whose common effect is a further increase in the range of 
activities and types of clients (Laure-Couderc, 1995; Webster, 1996; Bernstein and Lehrer, 
1995). In countries where the State has capability to implement evaluation and selection 
criteria for funding it has managed to retain the R&D management function.  
 
3. ELEMENTS OF DIVERGENCE IN RDI AND INNOVATION IN POST-
SOCIALISM  
 
An overview of the specific features of RDI in socialism and post-socialism compared to the 
model of RDI in a market economy shows that there are strong processes of convergence of 
post-socialist RDI with the market economy RDI. Common elements and similarities lie in:  
  rise of specialised suppliers; 
  increasing links between basic research and education; 
  ‘normalization’ of R&D priorities or decreasing bias towards military R&D; 
  more balanced relationship between process and product innovation; 
  an increasing variety of innovation and diffusion incentives characteristic for market 
economy; 
  in increasing competition; 
  increasing diversity of sectoral innovation patterns; 
  pluralism of technology search efforts; 
  integration of these countries with international R&D cooperation; 
  diversification of technology transfer channels. 
Not all these elements exist in post-socialism in their developed form. They should be seen as 
emerging elements of convergence of the post-socialist with the market-economy RDI model, 
which has developed to different degrees in different PSEs.  
 
  Our analysis shows that post-socialist RDI activities also have important elements of still 
persistent or temporary divergence. These differences are in the following:  
 
  enterprises have not yet become the main agents of innovation due to a multitude of 
factors among which corporate governance and demand constraints are the most 
prominent ones; 
 
  still externalised R&D or a situation where enterprises have not integrated previously 
externalised R&D capacities.  
 
  pervasive problems in R&D management due to the role of the state as owner who 
cannot simultaneously exercise the cash flow control function in R&D, especially in 
industrial institutes;  
 
  new gaps in RDI where applied and strategic R&D are absent from the spectrum of 
innovation activities. 
 
  These elements of divergence are the result as well as the cause of the weak innovation 
capability of post-socialist enterprises. They are a combination of still present socialist 
features (externalised R&D and lack of enterprise R&D) and of post-socialist features 
(privatization and governance problems which deter enterprises from ‘deeper restructuring’, Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
Innovation between ‘East’ And ‘West’? In Brzezinski, H and Fritsch, M (eds):  Innovation 
and Technical Change in Eastern Europe. Pathways to Industrial Recovery, Edward Elgar, 
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including restructuring of industrial R&D institutes). The result is weak technological effort 
with new gaps in RDI.  
 
3.1. Weak innovation capability and elements of divergence 
 
An overview of research into enterprise behaviour in post-socialism indicates very little ‘deep 
restructuring’ that involves substantial new investments, including R&D (EBRD, 1995). 
Induced by hard budget constraints the dominant type is intra-firm restructuring with strong 
labour shedding and with the introduction of some new technology. These patterns are 
common across different types of ownership. Only privatization with dominant outside 
ownership, especially FDI, appears to generate deeper restructuring (ibid., chapter 8).  
  Innovation surveys of Russia, Poland and Hungary conform to this picture from the 
innovation perspective. The Polish innovation survey shows that about 61% of enterprises 
introduced some kind of innovation into the market in 1992 (Korona, 1994). In Russia the 
situation is significantly worse as there were only 22.4% of enterprises that introduced any 
kind of innovation.6 Of the total number of enterprises only 18% introduced new or improved 
products and 14% introduced new technological processes (Gokhberg and Kuznetsova, 1996, 
p.9). This indicates very low technological innovation activities on average in Russian 
enterprises, an indication further supported by the fact that only 0.7% of Russian enterprises 
bought licences on the use of inventions (ibid., p.13).  
  When enterprises are so weak in innovation they continue to rely on externalised R&D 
perpetuating their dependence on external sources of technology and R&D. For example, 
since the beginning of transition in Russia only 5.4% of total enterprises, or 24.2% of those 
that introduced some innovation, have been performing in-house R&D (Gokhberg and 
Kuznetsova, 1996). Low or even decreasing demand for domestic technology when coupled 
with significant competitiveness problems of domestic R&D resulted in the only viable 
option for R&D institutes - to marketize themselves mainly by turning themselves into non-
R&D organizations.  
  Instead of being an asset to transformation the over-expanded and externalised R&D 
became burden on public policy. Solutions by developing bridging functions through 
technology centres and parks, university - industry links, etc. have very limited effects and 
are basically reinforcing patterns of technology transfer for which there is not yet effective 
demand (see Webster, 1996). Instead of forcing stand alone bridging functions policies are 
neglecting significant scope for supporting intra-organizational restructuring and in-house 
bridging and technology transfer capabilities. This is further aggravated by ambiguity about 
the public/private nature of R&D which has produced ambiguity in terms of the privatization 
of R&D (see Radosevic, 1996). 
  In conclusion, the remaining elements of institutional divergence in RDI should be seen 
more as symptoms of transformation crisis and difficulties, than organizational characteristics 
which are conducive to technology development. At the core of these differences is the 
(in)ability of post-socialist enterprises to articulate demand for technology.7 
 
                                                 
6Gokhberg and Kuznetsova (1996) consider this as rather low when compared with the late 1980s when  this 
indicator fluctuated within the range of 60-70% by enterprises of the ex-USSR (p. 5). However, realistic 
assessment should take into account the different nature of innovation before and after changes. 
7If we  take into account comparatively high development of human capital in CEECs then supply side 
constraints carry much less weight in explaining their weak innovation capability. Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
Innovation between ‘East’ And ‘West’? In Brzezinski, H and Fritsch, M (eds):  Innovation 
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3.2. Demand and supply for technology in post-socialism: some explanations 
 
The innovation survey for Poland indicates the lack of financial resources, very high bank 
interest rate and tremendous uncertainty of market opportunities as the most important 
obstacles to innovation activities (Korona, 1994). Also, from the Hungarian innovation 
survey 80 out of 110 responding firms consider the lack of financial sources as ‘very 
significant’ or ‘crucial’ factors hampering innovation (Inzelt, 1995). This explanation 
contradicts the EBRD (1995) conclusion that enterprises in PSE have accumulated significant 
financial assets, and hence the financial constraint explanation for low investment and weak 
innovation capability does not hold.8 
  An alternative explanation is that it is more the contraction of demand for investment goods 
that led to a decline in investment than the lack of finance (see EBRD, 1995). There have 
been significant sectoral and geographical shifts in patterns of demand in PSE towards 
services at the expense of industry. These are accompanied by shifts in relative prices 
towards services, raw materials and intermediate goods. Prices of finished goods, like 
textiles, and of machine-building and electrical/electronics have fallen far behind prices of 
energy and intermediate goods (see EBRD, 1995, table 4.3.).  
  The demand explanation also has support from the Russian innovation survey data. The 
number of innovative enterprises seems to be significantly higher in sectors that enjoy 
increases in relative prices. These are raw materials and intermediate goods sectors (oil 
extracting and refining, gas extracting; non-ferrous metallurgy; chemicals). In these sectors 
the share of innovative enterprises (42-49%) is more than double the national average 
(22.45%).9 It seems that in these sectors demand has been translated to a certain extent into a 
demand for technology. These sectors are also those with the highest share of enterprises that 
introduced new or improved technological processes (72-78%) as well as those where there is 
the highest share of enterprises with in-house R&D, about twice the national average of 
innovation enterprises (Gokhberg and Kuznetsova, 1996, table 2). 
  Explanations for weak innovation capability in post-socialism that take into account 
demand on product markets, deserve merit. However, robust explanations should take into 
account the differences between demand and supply for technology and for products which 
are not identical. Demand and supply for technology are derived from demand and supply for 
products and their coupling goes through enterprise, and not through market as is the case 
with products (see Tunzelmann, 1995, for basic approach along these lines). In this case the 
explanation for the weak innovation capability of post-socialist enterprises lies in the 
complexity of, not only market shifts, but also of enterprise organization, which includes 
governance and control issues.  
  On the demand side, reduction in the size of enterprises, and how demand for products gets 
translated within enterprises into demand for technology, play a part in the explanation of 
weak innovation capability. Whether demand from product markets may be translated into 
demand for technology depends on whether demand for technology can be articulated. 
Strategic uncertainties and coordination failures in post-socialism are pervasive. In Russia, 
from 3803 enterprises that made innovations between 1992-94 59.3% anticipate further 
innovations in 1995-97. However, from 13,176 enterprises that did not make any innovation 
                                                 
8One explanation for this contradiction may lie in the differences between aggregate finance figures and the 
enterprise structure of financial assets. 
9The only sector that has a higher share of innovative enterprises and which is a non-intermediate goods sector 
is medical equipment and pharmaceuticals (47.9%). (Gokhberg and Kuznetsova, 1996, p. 6). Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
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only 7.1% expect to be able to introduce innovation, while most (58.6%) found it difficult to 
respond on this (Gokhberg and Kuznetsova, 1996, p.8). This shows that strategic 
uncertainties in the environment are a big obstacle to innovation, which requires stable 
macroeconomic and institutional context. The differences in the macroeconomic and legal 
context do play an important role in this respect. While in Russia only innovative enterprises 
are optimistic about the prospects for further innovations, in Poland about 38% of firms who 
had introduced no innovation in 1992 declared their willingness to do so in the next 2 years 
(Korona, 1994). 
  On the supply side, factors of exogenous supply (focusing devices; induced innovation; 
S&T breakthroughs) and endogenous supply for technology (technology accumulation) 
should be taken into account.10 Changes in factor prices and the increasing cost sensitivity of 
enterprises have induced enterprises to direct their technology efforts towards issues of 
energy and material savings, quality, etc. The transformation of supply side factors onto 
product markets does not result automatically into changes on technology supply within 
enterprises. As shown by Swaan (1995), using the example of Poland and Hungary, old 
routines at enterprise level are not responding to changes in incentives due to factors like: 
regulatory uncertainty; tacit knowledge and learning by example; cognitive structures, 
hierarchical organization and trust and internal enterprise organization. 
  In conclusion, explanations for the weak innovation capability of post-socialist enterprises 
and the persistence of differences in RDI activities cannot be reduced to factors (cf. finance) 
and product (cf. demand) markets. They should be looked for in how changes on these 
markets are transformed into demand and supply for technology. Firms are the only 
organizations that transform technology into products (Tunzelmann, 1995). Factors of their 
innovative capability should be looked for, also, in industrial organization and institutional 
features of PSE. Elements of convergence indicate that in PSE innovation activities have 
acquired the general features of innovation in market economies as specified by Hanson and 
Pavitt (1987). The remaining elements of divergence show that this process is not fully 
finished and they partly explain the low innovation capability of post-socialist enterprises. 
 
4. ‘RECOMBINANT PROPERTY’ CAPITALISM AND INNOVATION  
 
In section 2 we argued that factors of the weak innovation capability of post-socialist 
enterprises are closely related to the remaining elements of institutional divergence in post-
socialist RDI. How long these elements of divergence will remain ‘temporary’ depends on 
the way in which some of the supply and the demand factors for technology, mentioned in the 
section 2, will be transformed.  
  If the economics of technical change is any guide, we can expect that in the medium-term 
enterprises take on the role of the main innovation agents. Technology is a firm-specific and 
externalised R&D cannot be substitute for in-house R&D (Mowery, 1983). Equally, in a post-
socialist economy, the State no longer has the resources to be a central player, imposing 
specific technology development directions, but can only be either a bad or good facilitator 
and coordinator of the self-regulation of the innovation process. If the market economy model 
of RDI is taken as a reference point than the RDI of PSE will settle within the broad features 
of the market economy, as specified by Hanson and Pavitt (1987). However, this alone will 
                                                 
10For this distinction see Tunzelmann (1995). Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
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and Technical Change in Eastern Europe. Pathways to Industrial Recovery, Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham 
 
20 
not ensure technological ‘catching-up’. Institutional convergence in RDI does not by itself 
produce technological modernization. 
  The institutional convergence in RDI does not tell us much about innovation prospects in 
eastern European capitalism(s). Once RDI settle within the general features of the market 
economy, as specified by Hanson and Pavitt (1987), the most interesting question becomes 
what are its innovation properties. The Hanson and Pavitt (1987) framework does not provide 
an answer since their objective was not to analyse innovation properties of different market 
systems, but to compare non-market and market systems in RDI. In order to illuminate this 
problem two scenarios can be imagined.  
  The first one of full convergence with the market economy model, while the second tries to 
take into account evolutionary, especially path dependent, features of post-socialist 
transformation.  
  A full convergence scenario assumes institutional transformation towards capitalism based 
on the clear distinction between the State and the business sphere, and on the important role 
of the capital market, especially the stock exchange. Tight budget constraints create strong 
incentives for institutional transformation. However, the scale and pace of privatization are 
such that only the stock exchange could ensure the necessary mobility of capital. 
Liberalization of capital flows, cemented further by international cooperative agreements 
(OECD, EU, GATT), and the role of national states as guardians of market order, ensure 
permanent pressure on capital mobility. In RDI this leads to the reduction of externalised 
R&D through strong public budget constraints. The state acts only as an indirect regulator of 
innovative activities. Tight and developed capital markets have resolved the governance 
conundrum and enterprises have become the main agents of the innovation process. 
  In this scenario we simply imposed convergence by assuming that RDI in PSE will 
eventually reach features of the ‘designated future’ or ‘hypothesised end-state’ (Stark, 1996, 
p.994).11 
  An alternative scenario assumes that the economic process is evolutionary, historically 
rooted and that the end states are formed through path dependent processes. One of these 
processes involves shifts in organizational and ownership boundaries of enterprises. On the 
basis of mass privatization and different forms of inter-enterprise control the current state is 
the one in which public - private boundaries are fuzzy and where a network of enterprises, 
rather than individual enterprises, seem to be units for understanding enterprise restructuring. 
So far, this essential feature of eastern European capitalism(s) is best analysed in the case of 
Hungary where it is called by Stark (1996) the ‘recombinant property’ model, meaning that 
the dominant form is neither private ownership with clearly defined property rights, nor the 
old form of state ownership, but mixed forms of state/private and inter-enterprise ownership. 
In its general theoretical form which is relevant to eastern Europe as well as to China it is 
developed in excellent manner in Peng and Heath (1996). 
  The mutual state/private and inter-organizational (banks/enterprises/investment funds) 
ownership is characteristic of other post-socialist countries, too. While in Hungary banks and 
funds are absent as private owners in the Czech R voucher privatization created ownership 
structure where investment privatization funds (IPFs) hold 50.7% of nominal stock and they 
in turn are indirectly owned by major banks.(EBRD, 1995). Russia has so far been dominated 
by domestic ‘insiders’ who own 46% of shares (Boycko et al., 1995). However, there are 
signs that insiders’ shares, especially dispersed shares of workers, are being increasingly 
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taken over by outsiders and especially investment funds which are owned indirectly by banks 
(Bim, 1996). Such ownership patterns are conducive to the rise of financial-industrial groups 
(FIGs)  
  FIGs are emerging through their privileged access to different exclusive rights, access to 
property finance and to state enterprise products (Freinkman, 1995, p.540). They usually 
comprise banks, trading companies, insurance companies and the voucher investment funds. 
Indirect ownership of industrial enterprises by banks through voucher investment funds 
enables FIGs to begin active enterprise restructuring on the basis of mainly internal savings 
and domestic capital. There are also indications of increasing inter-enterprise managerial 
coalitions which have started to mutually penetrate the stock of technologically related 
companies (Bim, 1996, p.33). This may create an ownership structure similar to that of 
Hungary. Lithuanian mass privatization has also created large scale groupings of companies 
described as post-socialist holdings (see Hirschhausen, 1995). 
  So far, Poland is, an important exception to this pattern (except in the case of new private 
conglomerates) as employee buy-outs through liquidation have been the dominant path of its 
transformation. However, the Polish programme of mass privatization implemented through 
15 National Investment Funds is likely to create mutual ownership structures similar to these 
in other countries. 
  The point is that the post-socialist transformation has created groupings of firms, banks and 
investment funds into conglomerate types of institutions like post-socialist holdings, 
financial-industrial groups or new private conglomerates.12 We consider this to be an 
important feature of eastern European capitalism(s) that will strongly influence its dynamic 
efficiency and innovation properties?13 How will the semi-autonomous status of individual 
enterprises, whereby shares of one enterprise are typically held by another enterprise, be 
reflected in specific innovation patterns? Could these groupings impede ‘creative destruction’ 
and function only as risk-spreading devices or could they be promoters of technological 
change? If ‘policies and practices aimed at restructuring in such context should target not the 
isolated firm but networks of firms ‘ (Stark, 1996, p.1009) then how are industrial R&D 
institutes treated in this process? How are technology functions (industrial engineering; 
quality management; design; incremental innovation) being redistributed within holdings? 
These are issues which have not yet been researched and about which we can only attempt to 
generate hypotheses. 
  Post-socialist holdings may mobilise larger resources and create ‘patient money’ for long-
term technological development. They may be seen as a response to pervasive market 
                                                 
12 These organisational forms are not unique only to the emerging eastern European  capitalism but also apply to 
Japan (kereitsu) and some late industrialising countries, like Korea (chaebols) and Latin America  (groupos 
economicos). It is important to bear in mind that the underlying factors of their creation are not only transition 
specific (cf. privatisation) but also developmental. Amsden and Hikino (1995) claim that conglomerates are 
inherent feature of  most latecomer industrialisers as they compensate for the lack of organisational capabilities 
in technology development. In this respect, these patterns in CEE should not be considered as anomalous but as 
natural. Probably, technological factors are not the only explanatory factors. Financial and political factors also 
play an important role. 
13Here we abstract from a possibility that there may be a few types of  eastern European capitalism with 
different innovation properties. Trade evidence shows already polarisation between countries like Hungary and 
the Czech Republic and Bulgaria and Romania (see Landesmann, 1996). While the first group has trade patterns 
which are not typical of developing countries, with a high share of engineering and a rising share of R&D and 
specialised supplier goods, the latter have trade exports dominated by labour intensive goods. 
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failures, primarily in the financial system as the supply of finance and restructuring agents 
cannot be provided through outside finance or from the market. Indeed, the limited role of 
outside investors is a pervasive feature of all PSE and, as pointed out in EBRD (1995), ‘it 
will take a long time before the financial sector shows the strength (typical for advanced 
industrial economies) necessary to generate and allocate savings effectively’ (p.99). This is 
especially relevant to the capital goods sector which is important for R&D and technology 
capabilities. In the context of poor financial markets industrial-financial groupings may 
compensate for these dizadvantages of institutional environment. 
  By nature, conglomerates are risk-spreading and may actually improve risk-taking. 
However, they can also impede creative destruction and inhibit the development of new 
design capabilities. They may turn into rent seekers and inhibit innovation in related parts of 
the economy.  
  The concentration of finance within specific business groups may constrain allocative 
efficiency of investments by limiting investment to those industrial groups that have both 
sufficient gross savings and profitable investment opportunities. This may undermine 
investment and innovation opportunities for stand-alone enterprises which do not possess 
internal savings and which cannot rely on outside finance. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
On the basis of Hanson and Pavitt’s (1987) characterization of the basic features of research, 
development and innovation (RDI) in socialist and market economies we analysed how much 
post-socialist economies (PSE) have assimilated in RDI the general features of market 
economy. Post-socialist RDI activities are in many of their elements converging towards a 
RDI of market economy. However, they still possess some socialist features (externalised 
R&D) as well as some peculiarly post-socialist features (ownership) which maintain their 
difference from the market economy model of RDI. The remaining elements of divergence 
are that: enterprises have not yet become the main agents of innovation; R&D is still 
externalised, with significant problems in its management arising from the State as owner 
being unable simultaneously to exercise a cash flow control function in R&D, and new gaps 
have emerged in RDI where applied and strategic R&D are absent from the spectrum of 
innovation activities. These differences are symptoms as well as factors of weak innovation 
capabilities of the post-socialist enterprises.  
  The remaining elements of institutional divergence in RDI should be seen more as 
symptoms of transformation crisis and difficulties than organizational characteristics which 
are conducive to technology development. At the core of these differences is the (in)ability of 
post-socialist enterprises to articulate demand for technology. Whether these features are 
temporary remains an open question. Our conclusion is that RDI in PSE will eventually 
achieve the features of ‘designated future’ or ‘hypothesised end-state’ as specified by Hanson 
and Pavitt (1987). However, once RDI settle within the general features of the market 
economy model the most interesting question becomes what are the specific innovation 
properties of the emerging eastern European capitalism(s)? Many of the specific innovation 
features of CEE capitalism originate from the specific ownership and control patterns which 
resemble certain features of conglomerates in latecomer economies.  
  In our analysis we abstracted from significant national differences. However, one of our 
conclusions is that it is the specific innovation properties of the emerging eastern European Radosevic, S (2000) Divergence or Convergence in Research and Development and 
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capitalism(s) that increasingly matter. This highlights the importance of national differences 
in the process of post-socialist transformation. In RDI, national differences among PSEs are 
significant in terms of the degree to which R&D was extra-mural or intra-mural; in terms of 
the previous openness of the economy and the degree to which R&D systems were Soviet-
like, in terms of importance of R&D in higher education and the role of Academies of 
Sciences. Differences between specific industrial sectors were equally widespread and are 
now further reinforced through differences in the post-socialist period. Elsewhere we 
analysed these inter-country differences through R&D (Auriol and Radosevic, 1996) and US 
patent data (Radosevic and Kutlaca, 1997).  
  The evolutionary nature of this process, in which, as argued by Grabher and Stark (1997), 
legacies, linkages and localities are producing a diversity of organizational forms, indicates 
that different innovative properties of specific PSE capitalism’s should be already in 
operation. Unfortunately, our understanding of national differences in terms of technology 
and innovation is still rudimentary. It is relatively better in terms of restructuring processes in 
institutional part of R&D but we are still a long way from understanding how different 
industrial sectors and their innovative behaviour are linked to post-socialist institutional 
transformation. Individual studies on industrial innovation on specific CEE countries have 
not yet been systematically overviewed and analysed. One of reasons for this is that 
conceptual and methodological problems in analysing innovation differences between 
countries and sectors are much more significant than when analysing the emergence of 
diverse organizational forms. Capabilities are linked with organizational forms but this link is 
not straightforward and their investigation requires detailed case studies based on very 
specific sectoral expertise. An understanding of the organizational forms of different 
emerging eastern European variants of recombinant capitalism is not sufficient for an 
understanding their dynamic or innovation features.  
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